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BREACH OF EMPLOYEE CONFIDENTIALITY: MOVING
TOWARD A COMMON-LAW TORT REMEDY
ScoTr L. FASTt
INTRODUCTION

Scenario 1: A woman tries to distance herself from a harassing
former lover who has violent tendencies. She moves to a new
location and obtains an unlisted telephone number. Her former
lover contacts her employer, who-unaware of the situationdiscloses her address and telephone number. With knowledge of
1
this information, the former lover resumes harassment.
Scenario 2: A parent is curious about the character of her
daughter's fianc6. She hires an investigator to perform a "background check." Through the fiance's employer, the investigator
discovers that he has a criminal record and has child support
payments deducted from his wages. The engagement is broken as
2
a result.
Scenario 3: An individual is seriously injured while on the job
and receives worker's compensation benefits. Her employer discloses her name and social security number to a computer database
service which tells subscribing employers whether job applicants
have ever received worker's compensation benefits in the past. She
now has extreme difficulty finding another job.3

t BA. 1991, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank the attorneys of Multnomah County Legal Aid Service
for introducing me to the issue of personnel-file confidentiality. Thanks are also
due to Veenita Bhatia, Mike Gilbert, Valerie Kelly, Sal Ongaro, and Lani Remick
for their helpful suggestions. With love and admiration, I dedicate this Comment
to my parents, Marce and Marilyn Fast.
I Cf. Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(stating that employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
employer disclosure of employee address).
2 Cf. Baker v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 833 (Idaho 1978)
(holding that employer's disclosure of employee's criminal record was not
actionable).
3 See JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE: How COMPUTERIZATION HAS
MADE EvERYONE'S PRIVATE LIFE AN OPEN SECRET 153-57 (1992).

Rothfeder

discusses the Employer's Information Service, Inc. ("EIS"), a database company
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As these three scenarios illustrate, employers have access to
highly sensitive information. This information not only concerns
employment matters (such as wages, working hours, and seniority),
but also concerns details about an employee's living arrangements,
physical and mental health, and other highly personal matters. An
employee's personnel file is perhaps more comprehensive and
revealing of her life than any other source of information. Yet,
most are surprised to discover that there is no legal remedy when
a private employer discloses true information about its employees
4
to third parties.
With the increasing ease of information storage and retrieval,
the potential for information misuse is growing. 5 Despite this
trend, however, courts and legislatures have done little to assure the
confidentiality of personal information in the workplace. 6 Absent
a collective bargaining agreement, private sector employees must
rely entirely on the goodwill of their employers to keep their
records secure. 7
Perhaps this problem could be addressed
effectively through legislation. 8 The courts, however, need not wait
for such a mandate. Just as the judiciary responded to the political,

that maintains over one million files on workers throughout the United States in a
variety of manual labor industries. The database contains names of those workers
who have applied for worker's compensation and who have sued their employer
because of an accident. EIS compiles its database from forms sent by cooperating
employers who routinely divulge pertinent information every time they terminate
an employee.
4 See Mordechai Mironi, The Confidentiality of Personnel Records: A Legal and
Ethical View, 25 LAB. L.J. 270, 270 (1974). As Mironi states:
[When an employee's] personnel records are in the hands of his
employer one might assume they are confidential. One might base this
assumption on the legal privilege held by physicians, lawyers, clergymen
and others.... In fact, the whole issue might seem so clear that only
academicians would debate the extent of the privilege.
Yet, the two spontaneous assumptions are both wrong.
Id.
5

See DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA:

IS YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE

PUBLIC EYE? 13-14 (1989) (discussing how access to individual files previously took
months when files were physically maintained, and how today's computer technology allows access to take place at the "speed of light").
6 See infra part II (discussing current and potential legal remedies).
7 See Kurt H. Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990's, 15 PEPP. L. REv.
551, 577-78 (1988) ("Employment information disclosure to third parties involves
the unpredictability or uncertainty of the employer's goodwill and personal value
system in handling the sensitive information.").
8 Only one state, Connecticut, has enacted legislation that prohibits disclosures
of personnel files to third parties. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f (West
1987).
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social, and economic changes of the nineteenth century by recognizing the right to privacy,9 it should respond to the realities of
today's workplace by securing the confidentiality of employment
information.
Ironically, in order to meet this challenge, the judiciary must be
willing to look beyond the right-to-privacy rubric. As this Comment
will demonstrate, the right to privacy and other traditional commonlaw doctrines have conceptual and constitutional limitations that
0
make them insufficient to assure confidentiality in the workplace.'
Courts must establish a new way of looking at this problem that
allows employees a greater degree of control and certainty regarding the sensitive information held by their employers.
Even though this Comment urges the judiciary to approach this
problem in a new way, courts need not construct a wholly new legal
doctrine for this purpose. Courts could build upon the recently
reconceptualized tort of breach of confidentiality.1 1 Using this
framework, courts could provide a common-law remedy for
disclosures to third parties in much the same way that they
recognize the confidentiality of physician-patient or attorney-client
relationships. 12
This approach would recognize the highly
sensitive nature of information disclosed by an employee to an
employer and would treat disclosures to third parties as breaches of
a duty not to disclose.
Part I of this Comment looks at the need for a legal remedy
when an employer discloses confidential information without
employee consent. Part II demonstrates the inability of privacy law,
defamation, and other legal frameworks to address this issue. Part
III argues that employees could potentially obtain a remedy at
9 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 193 (1890) ("Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the

demands of society."). For a discussion of the evolution of the right to privacy, see
infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
10See infra part II.B.
11

See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961)
(recognizing confidential relationship between bank and depositor); Doe v. Roe,
400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (recognizing confidential relationship
between psychiatrist/psychologist and patient); Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (Dist. Ct. 1971) (recognizing confidential relationship
between school official and student); see also Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1426, 1428-34 (1982) (tracing the
development of this tort over several decades); infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
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common-law tort for disclosures without consent. Recent changes
in how some courts address the tort of breach of confidential
relationship suggest that the tort could be applied in the employeremployee context to provide a remedy for unauthorized disclosures
of personal information. Finally, Part IV discusses how this tort
would function if applied in the employer-employee context and
suggests how courts could resolve some of the difficult issues this
tort would raise.
I. THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF
EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION
A. The Value of Employee Privacy
Two assumptions underlie this Comment's argument that an
employee should have a legal remedy when her employer discloses
personal information to third parties: (1) employer disclosures
violate employee privacy and (2) employers should face legal liability
for such violations. Admittedly, these are normative assumptions in
that their acceptance or rejection carries certain judgments about
the value of privacy in this society. While an extensive discussion
of the definition and value of privacy is well beyond the scope of
this Comment, the following section aims to clarify what privacy
interests are at stake in the employment context and to explain why
these interests are worthy of legal protection.
Courts and commentators identify several different aspects of
privacy. Within constitutional law, one's right to privacy protects
against invasive acts by the government and its officers, particularly
those acts implicating bodily integrity.18 At common law, most
courts recognize four kinds of torts for invasion of privacy:
disclosure of private facts, appropriation of name or likeness for
personal advantage, intrusion of one's physical solitude or seclusion,
14
and publicity that places one in a false light in the public eye.

'" See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (stating that the
constitutional right to privacy prohibits states from forbidding use of
contraceptives); see also infra note 54 (noting distinction between the constitutional
and common-law right to privacy).
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (1984).
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Scholars have viewed privacy as including elements of "[a]utonomy,
16
15
identity, and intimacy" or "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude."
For the purposes of this Comment, the focus is on the aspects
of personal control or autonomy that are inherent in the concept of
privacy. According to Charles Fried, "The concept of privacy
requires.., a sense of control and ajustified, acknowledged power
to control aspects of one's environment.... [P]rivacy is notjust an
absence of information abroad about ourselves; it is a feeling of
security in control over that information." 17 When an employer
discloses an employee's address, salary, or medical problem to a
third party without consent, the employee loses her ability to make
choices about who has access to this information. Thus, the focus
here is on an employee's sense of loss when her employer is able to
define and shape the employee's identity beyond the employment
18
relationship.
Some may argue that this loss of autonomy is not significant
enough to warrant legal protection. The value of autonomy,
however, is not simply that it gives individuals a peaceful state of
mind or a greater sense of dignity. At its root, autonomy encourages the kind of atmosphere that is necessary to a free and
democratic society. As privacy scholar Alan Westin explains:
15

Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977).
16 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
17 Charles Fried, Pivacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968). Similarly, another
commentator notes:
[T]he basic attribute of an effective right of privacy is the individual's
ability to control the circulation of information relating to him-a power
that is essential to maintaining social relationships and personal freedom.
Correlatively, when an individual is deprived of control over the spigot
that governs the flow of information pertaining to him, in some measure
he becomes subservient to those people and institutions that are able to
manipulate it.
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRiVACY 25 (1971).
18 It is important to emphasize that this sense of control over personal
information transcends notions of private spheres or intimate facts. While
information relating to one's mental health or method of contraception lies at the

core of privacy, disclosure of "nonintimate" matters such as one's social security
number or unlisted telephone number also infringes upon one's sense of
autonomy. See Gavison, supra note 16, at 429 & n.26 (rejecting the idea that one
should restrict the notion of privacy to "private" information and asserting that
"privacy is related to the amount of information known about an individual"); see
also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing a shortcoming of the
privacy tort in the employment context, which is that it often fails to protect
disclosures of nonintimate information).
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The autonomy that privacy protects is ... vital to the
development of individuality and consciousness of individual
choice in life.... This development of individuality is particularly
important in democratic societies, since qualities of independent
thought, diversity of views, and non-conformity are considered
desirable traits for individuals. Such independence requires time
for sheltered experimentation and testing of ideas, for preparation
and practice in thought and conduct, without fear of ridicule or
penalty, and for the opportunity to alter opinions before making
19
them public.
Accordingly, an employer's ability to disclose information about her
employees without penalty inhibits an employee's freedom of
expression and action.
B. The Information Collected
As the Privacy Protection Study Commission noted in its 1977
report on employment records, the quantity of records maintained
by employers has risen dramatically in recent years. 20 An employer collects a large quantity of information from her employees
during the employment relationship, beginning with the initial
application form and periodically throughout the relationship. A
brief list of what one might find in an employee's personnel file
includes the following: application forms, interviewer's notations,
test scores, periodic appraisals, transfers and promotions, disciplinary actions, salaries, tax withholdings, contributions to organizations, and criminal and medical records. 2 ' Government require23
ments, 22 greater emphasis on human resources management,
and the advancement of computerized data storage and retrieval
systems have contributed to the size and scope of information
19 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 34 (1967).
0 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, EMPLOYMENT RECORDS: APPENDIX

2

3 TO THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 9-10 (1977)

[hereinafter EMPLOYMENT RECORDS REPORT] (tracing the growth of records since
the early 1900s).
21 See DALE YODER, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 711
(6th2 2ed. 1970).

See EMPLOYMENT RECORDS REPORT, supra note 20, at 26-30 (discussing how

governmental action has increased employment-related record keeping). Examples
of government regulations that have led to an increase in record keeping, though
not statutorily mandating it, include the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. In 1991), and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
23 Examples include retirement plans and health insurance.
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typically held by an employer. The necessity and accuracy of this information presents serious questions, but these issues are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
C. The Desirefor Confidentiality
The most common criticism of imposing a legal duty of
nondisclosure on employers is that it is simply not necessary. The
vast majority of employers, so the argument goes, do not disclose
information about employees. 24 While it may be true that major
corporations typically have policies against disclosing information
to third parties, 25 studies indicate that employers routinely violate
the confidentiality of employee personal information and that
employees are very concerned about this issue.
According to a recent survey of large American industrial corporations, eighty percent of corporations disclose personal information to credit grantors and fifty-eight percent give data to
landlords. 26 Thirty-eight percent do not have a policy concerning
which records are routinely disclosed in response to inquiries from
government agencies. 27 Fifty-seven percent of these corporations
24 See Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Personnel Records: A Look at Employee
Attitudes, Civ. LBERTiES REv., Jan-Feb. 1978, at 28, 28 ("[E]mployee privacy has
been characterized as a 'non-problem' being manipulated by malcontented employees 25
and civil liberties groups looking for agitating tools.").
See RONALD E. BERENBEIM, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY 22 (1990).

Berenbeim

provides a typical company policy for responding to information requests from
third parties. In part, it states: "It is a domestic policy of the Corporation and its
subsidiaries to respond to requests for information on our employees from third
parties subject to review and permission to release such information by the
affected employee(s)." Id. The policy goes on to state specific procedures for
third-party telephone inquiries and written requests. See id.; see also Peter M.
Panken & Stacy B. Babson, Creating the Personnel Paper Trail Personnel Manuals
and Grievance Procedures, in 1 RESOURCE MATERIALs: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW 179, 218 (Peter M. Panken ed., 6th ed. 1992) (stating a model confidentiality
policy that specifies that the employer "will provide employee information to
outside agencies only upon written authorization of the employee or as provided
by law").
26
See LINOWES, supra note 5, at 40-41. One hundred twenty-six Fortune 500
companies, which employ over 3.7 million persons, responded to the survey. See
id. at 40. A recent research report suggests that employers are reluctant to
disclose employee performance appraisals, disciplinary records, and psychological
test scores. See BERENBEIM, supra note 25, at 8 (stating that more than 75% of
employers surveyed will not release such information even with employee
consent). The report, however, did not provide any statistics regarding the
percentage
of employers that disclose information without consent.
27
See LINOWES, supra note 5, at 41.
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28
do not notify an employee when such disclosures are made.

Only forty-two percent of the corporations even tell their employees
29
about the company disclosure practices.
These practices are clearly of concern to employees. According
to one survey, more than fifty percent of workers and executives
consider the personal information kept by their employers to be
"very important" in terms of privacy, and nearly twenty-five percent
feel that their employer's policies on confidentiality are poor or can
be improved. 30 Employees may be especially concerned about the
confidentiality of information pertaining to medical records and pay
31
rates.
II. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL LEGAL REMEDIES

While employees generally do not have a legal remedy when
employers disclose confidential information to third parties,
statutory and common law do provide some relief depending on the
kind of employer and the kind of information involved. This
section surveys the patchwork of legal remedies available to
employees in certain circumstances. Ultimately, however, all of
these remedies combined fail to give employees the protection they
deserve.
A. CurrentStatutes ConcerningPersonnelFiles
At present, only Connecticut statutorily prohibits private
employers from disclosing information about employees without
their consent.3 2 In comparison to legislation in other states, this
28 See David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the
'90s, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 591, 593 (1990) (analyzing the same Fortune 500
stud ).
d) See id. at 594.
30 See Westin, supra note 24, at 29.
31 See G. Stephen Taylor & J. Stephen Davis, Individual Privacy and ComputerBased Human Resource Information Systems, 8J. Bus. ETHIcS 569, 570 (1989).
32 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f (West 1987). In pertinent part, the
provision states:
No individually identifiable information contained in the personnel
file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an employer
to any person or entity not employed by or affiliated with the employer
without the written authorization of such employee except where the
information is limited to verification of dates of employment and the
employee's title or position and wage or salary ....
Id. The provision allows several exceptions to this duty, including information
disclosed pursuant to an administrative summons or judicial order, requests from
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law goes the furthest to give employees control over information
held by their employers. While statutes in some states give
employees the right to view their personnel files and make necessary
corrections,33 no other state statutorily limits what an employer
34
can do with personnel file data once obtained.
Public employees at the state and federal level enjoy much
greater protection from third-party disclosures than employees in
the private sector. In response to what was perceived as too much
public access to sensitive personal information, Congress passed the
Privacy Act of 1974.3' Under the Act, records identifying an
employee by name may not be released to the public without the
employee's consent, subject to several exceptions.3 6 Some states
37
have passed similar legislation to protect state public employees.
law enforcement officials, medical emergencies, compliance with federal or state
law and regulations, and terms of collective bargaining agreements. See id. The
provision does not state what remedy, if any, an employee would be entitled to in
case of such disclosure and no court has addressed this issue.
Note that this statute only concerns information contained in one's personnel
file.
Thus, an employer's disclosure of information gained through the
employment relationship but not incorporated into one's personnel file
presumably would not be a violation.
By contrast, the tort of breach of
confidentiality would impose liability regardless of this distinction. See infra notes
153-57 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West 1989) (requiring private employers
to permit employees to inspect their own personnel files); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-128b (West 1987) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (West 1988 &
Sup. 1993) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.503 (West Supp. 1993) (same).
Some states, however, limit what an employer may do with a particular kind
of information. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.20(a) (West 1982) (requiring
employers to establish safeguards against the unauthorized use or disclosure of
medical information they have obtained); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1026 (West 1989)
(requiring that an employer "make reasonable efforts to safeguard the privacy of
the employee as to the fact that he or she has enrolled in an alcohol or drug
rehabilitation program); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.506 (West Supp. 1993)
("An employer or former employer shall not divulge a disciplinary report, letter of
reprimand, or other disciplinary action to a third party ... or to a party who is
not a part of a labor organization representing the employee, without written
notice . .. ").
s5 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (stating standards and procedures to govern agency
disclosure of individual records to any person or agency); see also Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)(6) (1988) (exempting personnel and
medical files from government public disclosure requirements).
36 The exceptions include instances in which a record is sought by law
enforcement officials or by a consumer reporting agency.
See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b)(7), (b)(12) (1988).
Before disclosing information to a consumer
reporting agency, the government must satisfy procedural requirements aimed at
preventing unnecessary disclosure. See 31 U.S.C. § 3711(f) (1988).
37 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.24 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (stating
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Thus, public employees at both the federal and state level enjoy
much greater protection from disclosure than their private sector
8
counterparts.3
Federal laws regulate personnel records in the private sector in
very limited ways.3 9 Perhaps the most significant of these laws is
one recently enacted as part of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. 40 Under this law, any information that an employer obtains
as the result of a medical examination must be "maintained on
separate forms and in separate medical files" and be "treated as a
confidential medical record."41 Other federal laws and regulations
control how employers may use immigration documents, 42 allow
employee access to records pertaining to workplace health and

standards and procedures to govern agency disclosure of individual records);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-193 (West 1988) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-1-6-3
(West 1991) (same); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 66A, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (same);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.43 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (same); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 1347.05, .08 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1992) (same); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-2-202, -302 to -304 (Supp. 1993) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-380 (Michie
1987 & Supp. 1993) (same).
-" Recently, a Clinton administration official came under fire for allegedly
disclosing information to the press that he obtained from the personnel files of
Bush political appointees. The State Department Inspector General's office is
investigating whether the official violated the Privacy Act. See Steven A. Holmes,
Retrieval ofBush PersonnelFiles by Clinton Aide Is Under Inquiy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1993, § 1, at 6; Walter Pincus, State Department to Probe Access to Personnel Files:
Possible Privacy Act Violations Cited in Check of Bush Appointees, WASH. POST, Sept. 3,
1993, at Al.
39 In 1975, Representatives Barry Goldwater, Jr., and Edward Koch proposed a
bill that would have extended the Privacy Act to the private sector. See H.R. 1984,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill required employers to establish a procedure
to prevent employee personal information from being used outside of the employment relationship. See id. § 2(b)(9). Unfortunately, the bill was unsuccessful and
did not even come up for a vote. See generally Perry R. Fredgant, Comment,
Confidentiality of PersonnelFiles in the Private Sector, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 473, 48687 (1981); Charles W. Pauly, Comment, Let Industry Beware: A Survey of Privacy
Legislation and Its PotentialImpact on Business, 11 TULSA L.J. 68, 76-81 (1975).
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12150 (Supp. 11 1991).
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1991). This confidentiality may be
breached only to inform supervisors about employee accommodations, to provide
medical treatment, and to inform government officials about compliance with the
law. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii). Federal contract employers taking part in
affirmative action plans are also required to keep medical information
confidential, with similar exceptions. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.6(c)(3) (1992).
42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(4) (1988) (stating that an employer may retain copies
of an employee's immigration or citizenship papers but only for the purpose of
complying with the law).
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safety, 43 and allow employers to protect potentially confidential
44
affirmative action data that they release to the government.
B. CurrentJudicialDoctrines Relating to PersonnelFiles
1. Defamation
Although the common-law tort of defamation has significant
limitations, it has provided employees with a certain level of
protection through its deterrent effect. In recent years, courts have
been increasingly willing to recognize defamation suits in the
employment context.45
Although an action giving rise to
defamation will rarely concern traditional privacy issues,46 the
success of recent defamation suits has led some attorneys to advise
employers not to disclose any information about former employees
to third parties except the dates of employment and positions
held. 47
Employer fear of defamation suits, however, does not sufficiently address the privacy problem that employees face. Even if
defamation suits do have the desirable effect of curtailing some
41 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(e) (1992) (stating that employees must have access to
medical and toxic exposure records maintained by the employer pursuant to the
Occupational Safety and Health Act).
44 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-60.4(a), (d) (1992) (stating that employers may protect the
confidentiality of affirmative action records released to the government by either
using coded data or by requesting that the records not be subject to the Freedom
of Information Act's disclosure requirements).
45 See Pappas v. Air France, 652 F. Supp. 198, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(recognizing defamation for accusation of theft); Battista v. United Illuminating
Co., 523 A.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Conn. App. Ct.), (recognizing defamation for
assertion of unethical conduct), certif denied, 525 A.2d 1352 (Conn. 1987); Kraus v.
Brandstetter, 562 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-29 (App. Div. 1990) (recognizing defamation
for accusation of incompetence).
46 While defamation law protects employees from false accusations, it is useless
against disclosures of true information, no matter how sensitive. Interests in
privacy and accuracy are related to a certain extent, however, as both concern
information generated by the employer-employee relationship. The proposed tort
of breach of confidentiality in the employment context would address both
interests simultaneously by limiting all types of information from disclosure
regardless
of content. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
47
See Gary R. Siniscalco, Wrongful Termination and Emerging Torts, 442 P.L.I.
LIT. 379 (1992), available in Westlaw, TP-All database, PLI file, at *60; see also
Janet Swerdlow, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theoty for Employer Liability, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1645, 1645 (1991) (stating that increases in employee defamation
litigation have led many employers to adopt "no comment" policies).
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provide any redress
employer disclosures, this legal doctrine will not
48
in the situations where disclosures still occur.
2. Negligent Maintenance of Personnel Files
Another common-law theory that has had an impact on employment information is negligence. In Quinones v. United States,49 a
federal court of appeals found that Pennsylvania common law
imposed a duty of due care on an employer that undertook the
responsibility of maintaining personnel files. 50 The court thus
held that the plaintiff may have a cause of action if his employer
(the U.S. government) was negligent in releasing incorrect
information regarding the employee's termination and that the
51
employer could be held liable for resulting damages.
While the "duty of care" approach could potentially give
employees protection against negligent disclosures as well as
negligent maintenance of personnel files, no court has extended the
duty that far. In fact, one case suggests that this tort is falling out
of favor on the grounds that it is more appropriate to view
52
maintenance of personnel files from a contracts perspective.
Consequently, expansion of the duty of care approach to encompass
personnel record confidentiality does not seem likely.
3. Common-Law Invasion of Privacy
Some commentators predict that the invasion of privacy tort will
become one of the most powerful legal tools for employees in the
1990s. 5 3 Although this may be true in a variety of employment
4

8 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.

49 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974).
50 See id. at 1278.
51 See id. Because the employer in Quinones was the U.S. government, the
plaintiff was precluded from bringing a defamation suit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. See id. at 1271 & n.3. While the court could have based its ruling
solely on federal regulations and executive orders that mandated a duty of care,
the court chose to base its decision on Pennsylvania common law as well. See id. at
1277-78. Two years later, a federal district court recognized the tort against a
private employer based solely on common law. See Bulkin v. Western Kraft East,
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 437, 442-43 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
52
See Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 572 F. Supp. 200, 206 (D.D.C.
1983) (stating that breach of contract is the appropriate avenue for relief absent a
"duty to maintain employment records, imposed by statute or law, that would give
rise to a negligence action").
5
See, e.g., KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 141 (1987)
("Current employment litigation confirms that invasion of privacy can be expected
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contexts, the conceptual limitations of this doctrine do not
adequately protect employee information.
The present common-law right to privacy-' originates from a
law review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890. 55 In order to curb what they perceived as increasing intrusions into the private sphere brought about by new technologies and
yellow-sheet journalism,5 6 Warren and Brandeis suggested that
courts expand the common law beyond traditional legal doctrines,
including the then-existing tort of breach of confidence. They
proposed an entirely new tort action5 7aimed at the publication of
private facts not of "general interest."
The article proved to be highly influential among the nation's
judiciary and legislatures5 8 and eventually led to acceptance of
some form of "private-facts" right to privacy5 9 in the vast majority

to gain wider court approval."); Linowes & Spencer, supra note 28, at 591 (stating
that "privacy is becoming the workplace issue of the 1990s"); Taylor & Davis, supra
note 31, at 570 (noting the "emerging body of case law that protects individual
privacy" in the workplace).
5 One should not confuse the common-law right to privacy with the
constitutional right to privacy, which protects an individual against certain invasive
acts by the government and its officers. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965) (stating that the constitutional right to privacy prohibits states
from forbidding use of contraceptives). The common-law right to privacy, in
contrast, is grounded in state tort law and protects one against acts by private
groups or individuals. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967)
("[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by
other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely
to the law of the individual States.") (footnote omitted); McNally v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir.) ("The constitutional right of privacy is
not to be equated with the common-law right recognized by state tort law."), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 8 (1990 & Supp. 1993)
(noting distinction between constitutional and common-law doctrines).
55 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 193.
56 See id. at 195.
57
Id. at 214.
58 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 117, at 849 ("The recognition and
development of the so-called 'right to privacy' is perhaps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal periodicals upon the courts." (footnote omitted));
Harry KIaven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966) (describing the article as the "most influential
law review article of all"); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewellto Warren and Brandeis'sPrivacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 292 (1983)
("Their advocacy of this new tort created a minor revolution in the development
of the common law.").
'9 The private-facts tort is actually one of four types of invasions of privacy
currently recognized by most courts. The other three types include appropriation
of name or likeness for personal advantage, intrusion upon one's physical solitude
or seclusion, and publicity that places a person in a false light in the public eye.
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states.6 0
While the elements of the private-facts tort vary
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, many courts either rely on
the formulation of the Second Restatement of Torts, 61 or the
elements articulated by Dean Prosser.62 The Restatement requires
the plaintiff to prove that the matter publicized "would be highly
offensive to the reasonable person" and "is not of legitimate
concern to the public." 63 Prosser stated that three requirements
had to be satisfied for recovery:
of

(1) the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure
and not a private one; (2) the facts disclosed to the public must be

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note
14, § 117, at 851. The private-facts tort, however, is the dearest derivative of the
original
right to privacy articulated by Warren and Brandeis.
60
Although the right to privacy did not find widespread acceptance initially, by
the 1930s most courts began accepting the doctrine. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 14, § 117, at 851-63. Today, at least 36 states explicitly recognize some form
of private-facts right to privacy at common law or by statute. See, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1993) (stating that "[a] person shall
have a right against unreasonable ... interference with his privacy"); WIS. STAT.
§ 895.50 (1983 & Supp. 1992) (recognizing the right of privacy for personal
matters); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250 (Fla. 1944) (stating that "there is a
right of privacy, distinct in and of itself" under the common law); Beaumont v.
Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977) (explaining that an invasion of privacy
occurs when private facts that are embarrassing are exposed to the public);
Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 679 (Tex.)
("[E]ffective protection of the fundamental 'zones of privacy' ... implies a
concomitant right to prevent unlimited disclosure of information .... "), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1976); see also Zimmerman, supra note 58, at 365-67 (providing an overview of privacy law in all 50 states). A handful of states have expressly
rejected the private-facts right to privacy, including New York. See Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902) ("[T]he so-called 'right of
privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence.").
61 See, e.g., Wasser v. San Diego Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (Ct. App. 1987);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1330 (Conn.
1982); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1350 (Del. 1992); Wolf v. Regardie, 553
A.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. 1989); Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 689
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d
1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
283 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Werner v.
Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Kan. 1985); Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430
(La. 1983); Matheson v. Bangor Publishing Co., 414 A.2d 1203, 1204 (Me. 1980);
Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421, 425 (Md.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976);
Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795
S.W.2d 488, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C.
1988).
62 See, e.g., Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Ct. App. 1980) (citing
Prosser); Oden v. Cahill, 398 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (same);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 117, at 856.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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private facts, and not public ones; and (3) the matter made public
objectionable to
must be one which would be highly offensive 6and
4
a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
While employees have found some success with the private-facts
tort in recent years, 65 the requirements for this cause of action
present significant barriers in many employment contexts. First,
Prosser's "public disclosure" requirement mentioned above may bar
suit where the employer makes a disclosure to a small group or a
In the
single individual, as opposed to the public at large. 6 6
employment context, such a limited disclosure is far more likely
than any broad dissemination, as the hypothetical scenarios at the
beginning of this Comment suggest. 67 For example, in Eddy v.
Brown, 68 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an employee did
not satisfy the publicity requirement of the private-facts tort where
his employer only told a limited number of his co-workers that he
was undergoing psychiatric treatment.69 The court stated that
"[p]ublication to the community of employees at staff meetings and
discussions between defendants and other employees is clearly
different from the type of public disclosure" required.70 While
some states have applied the publicity requirement less rigidly in
6KEETON ET AL.,
65

supra note 14, § 117, at 856-57 (footnote omitted).

See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
' According to the Restatement:
Publicity... means that the matter is made public, by communicating it
to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge....
Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy... to communicate
a fact concerning the plaintiffs private life to a single person or even to a
small group of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a
newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill
distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the
radio, or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient
to give publicity ....
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
RESTATEMENT
67
See supra Introduction.

68 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986).

See id. at 78.
Id. at 78 n.13 (quoting Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437 (E.D. Pa.
1983)).
69
7
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analogous circumstances, 71 many jurisdictions have refused to do
72

SO.

A second barrier posed by the private-facts tort is embodied in
its very name: only disclosure of "private" facts constitute a tortious
action. Some facts will clearly fall into this category, such as any
information relating to an individual's physical or mental health. 7Most information, however, falls into a grey area. For example, in
Baker v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,74 the Idaho Supreme Court held
that an employer's disclosure of an employee's criminal record was
disclosure of public, not private, facts and thus was not
actionable. 75 Quoting the First Restatement of Torts, the court stated
that
criminals "are the objects of legitimate public interest during a
period of time after their conduct ... has brought them to the
public attention; until they have reverted to the lawful and
unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community, they are
subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the
curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains, and
6
7

victims."

7'See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Il. App. Ct. 1990). In this
case, the court held that an employee could bring a suit for public disclosure of
private facts where her employer disclosed her masectomy surgery to some coworkers. Applying Prosser's three-part test for recovery, the court liberally construed
the public disclosure requirement by reasoning that "where a special relationship
exists between the plaintiff and the 'public' to whom the information has been
disclosed, the disclosure may be just as devastating to the person even though the
disclosure was made to a limited number of people." Id. at 903. See also Beaumont
v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 523,532 (Mich. 1977) (holding that employer's disclosure
of employee's health problems and insubordinate behavior to Army Reserve in which
employee served satisfied publicity requirement).
' See, e.g., Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (stating
that disclosure of information to only five employees did not constitute sufficient
publicity); Rogers v. International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867,870 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (holding that information conveyed to employees who require such
information did not constitute publication of private activities).
" See, e.g., Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio App. 1985)
(holding that employee could reasonably expect that employer medical examiner
would treat her highly personal medical information as confidential); see also
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) (stating that plaintiff's
plastic surgery was a private fact). In any event, disclosures of medical information
are proscribed by federal and state statutory law. See supra notes 34, 41 and
accompanying text.
'4587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978).
75 See id. at 833.
76 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939)). The court
noted, however, that disclosure of crimes that took place in the distant past may be
actionable. See Baker, 587 P.2d at 833; see also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
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Even less likely to pass the private-facts requirement would be
information as simple as addresses and telephone numbers.
Although pertaining to a slightly different context, a Louisiana
appellate court made clear that employee addresses should not be
considered private information:
A person's employment, where he lives, and where he works are
exposures which we all must suffer. We have no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to our identity or as to where we live or
work. Our commuting to and from where we live and work is not
done clandestinely and each place provides a facet of our total
77
identity.
Thus, even the scenario given at the beginning of this Comment
concerning the disclosure to the harassing former lover 78 would
not be actionable as a private-facts tort.
A third barrier posed by this tort is the requirement that the
disclosure be highly offensive to the reasonable person. This
element in essence takes control away from the employee
concerning what is known about her and places the control in the
hands of a judge or jury. Why must a disclosure be shocking or
extremely invasive before it constitutes a tort? If the essence of
privacy is a feeling of control over information about ourselves, it
should not matter whether our employer discloses information
about one's use of contraceptives or one's negative performance
evaluation.
This question brings us to a much larger issue looming over the
private-facts tort as a whole. The problem with this tort is not
simply one of line drawing. Even a court sympathetic to the needs
of the employee could not construe the private-facts tort broadly
enough to provide protection in many circumstances. At some
point, the First Amendment ultimately provides a shield for the
employer against actions based on the content of its speech.
483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (holding that publication of plaintiff's crime 11 years
after he had "paid his debt to society" constituted public disclosure of private
facts).
77 Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that
a state public records law required disclosure of city employee names and
addresses and that such disclosure was not actionable based on private-fact tort
nor U.S. or state constitutions), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 657 (La. 1979). The court
appeared to conflate the common law and constitutional origins of a right to
privacy.
See supra note 54.
7
1 See

supra Introduction.
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Much of this tension between the First Amendment and the
private-facts tort stems from a strong aversion to censorship by the
press. 7 9 Admittedly, this tension is greatly diminished when concerning a non-media defendant, such as an employer, who disseminates information to a limited audience. Yet the case law suggests
that courts are not only critical of the private-facts tort because of
its impact on the media. A second difficulty with this tort stems
from its subjective treatment of the content of one's speech.80
The private-facts requirement and especially the "highly offensive"
requirement force courts and juries to use standards which are
difficult to apply consistently and are more likely to turn on
personal inclinations than a clear societal norm. In this way, the
private-facts tort tends to have a chilling effect on speech and
particularly discourages the disclosure of information that is
repugnant or controversial.
This is not to say that the First Amendment is on the verge of
eradicating the private-facts tort; the Supreme Court has stated that

this tort plays a needed role in American jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, the tension between the First Amendment and this tort
remains largely unresolved. This tension prevents courts from
applying this tort in ways that would fully address the needs of
individuals in the employment context. While the private-facts tort
may serve employees in the most egregious circumstances or on
sporadic occasions, the tort cannot provide any sense of employees'
control over their identities.

79

See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (referring to the

private-facts tort, the court stated that "[b]ecause the gravamen of the claimed injury

is the publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is
embarrassing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy
most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press"); see also
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,533 (1989) (noting that both the First Amendment
and the private-facts tort are "'plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns

of our society'" (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. at 491)).
80 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519 (1991) (noting the
context-based nature of the private-facts tort).
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III. TOWARD EMPLOYMENT-RECORD
CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER LAW

Given the inadequacies of privacy, defamation, and negligence,
it is unlikely that the courts will be able to form a reliable remedy
out of any of these doctrines. Realizing these shortcomings, some
commentators have seen legislation as the only possible means of
providing protection. 8 ' Recent changes in the ways some courts
view the tort of breach of confidentiality, however, suggest that
confidentiality of employment information is attainable at common
law.
A. The TraditionalApproach to
ConfidentialRelationships

At common law, courts have traditionally recognized certain
relationships that carry a duty to act or not to act in certain waystypically called either fiduciary relationships or, more generally,
confidential relationships. Under this doctrine, courts recognize
that certain relationships in the society implicitly signify an
obligation to "act in good faith, and with due regard to the interests
of the one reposing the confidence."8 2 As a matter of law, these
84
83
relationships usually include attorney-client, partner-partner,
principal-agent, 85 trustee-beneficiary, 86 and venturer-joint
venturer.8 In the context of these relationships, an individual
S See Fredgant, supra note 39, at 475-76 (arguing that the Privacy Act of 1974
should be extended to apply to employment relationships in the private sector).
36A C.J.S. Fiduciaty 384 (1991).
See, e.g., Trafton v. Youngblood, 442 P.2d 648, 655 (Cal. 1968) (stating that the
attorney-client relationship "'is one of a strict fiduciary and confidential nature'")
(quoting Bradner v. Vasquez, 272 P.2d 11, 13 (1954)).
' See, e.g., Olivier v. Uleberg, 23 N.W.2d 39,43 (N.D. 1946) (stating that partners
have a fiduciary relationship).
" Se4 e.g., Moon v. Phipps, 411 P.2d 157, 161 (Wash. 1966) (stating that a
principal-agent relationship is transformed into a fiduciary relationship "either
expressly or by implications of law or fact," when the principal "relax[es] the care and
vigilance which the law ordinarily requires" and she "would customarily exercise on
[her] own behalf").
m See e.g., Swenson v. Wintercorn, 234 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ill. App. 1968) (stating that
a fiduciary relationship exists between a trustee and a beneficiary as a matter of law).
"7 See e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that joint
venturers are "subject to fiduciary duties akin to those of partners" and "owe to one
another.., the duty of the finest loyalty").
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must behave with the interest of the other in mind-including not
disclosing information that may harm her. On a case-by-case basis,
a court may recognize a relationship beyond these contexts as
confidential, so long as such a relationship is characterized by
"kinship."88 In the past, courts have recognized relationships
between landlord and tenant, husband and wife, and priest and
penitent as confidential. 9
Since a finding of a confidential
relationship has traditionally turned on trust and expectation of
good relations between the parties, courts have not yet found such
a relationship to exist between employer and employee.
B. A New Approach to Confidential
Relationships
Until the last few decades, courts were reluctant to expand the
tort of breach of confidential relationship beyond limited circumstances.9 0 Some speculate that this period of dormancy for the
tort was due to the emergence of the right to privacy as first
articulated by Warren and Brandeis.91 Courts may have assumed
that the right to privacy provided a more appropriate framework in
which to address confidentiality concerns.9 2 As the doctrine

88 15A C.J.S. Confidential 352 (1967).
See WESTIN, supra note 19, at 335.

89
9

g According to one commentator, courts explicitly or implicitly addressed the
tort of breach of confidential relationship in the context of personal information
(that is, not under trade secret law or common-law copyright) only six times prior
to 1960: Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 195 (Ga. 1930) (holding that
misappropriation of picture of deformed child by hospital staffworkers violated
trust relationship); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (Ky. 1912) (holding that
photographer's unauthorized use of pictures of dead babies breached the confidential relationship); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832-33 (Neb. 1920)
(stating that private cause of action exists for physician betrayal of patient secrets);
Munzer v. Blaisdell, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that mental institution's disclosure of patient records breached confidential relationship), aff'd mem.,
58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1945); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543, 544
(C.P. Phila. County 1940) (holding that physician's unauthorized photograph of
patient's disfigured face breached trust or confidence); Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P.
572, 573 (Wash. 1917) (affirming physician-patient confidentiality but allowing
disclosure in the courtroom if material and relevant). See Vickery, supra note 11,
at 1454 n.146.
91 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 193; Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455
(speculating that the tort of breach of confidential relationship never assumed
prominence in the United States because many courts handled disclosures of
personal information under the right of privacy rubric).
92 Warren and Brandeis argued that the breach of confidence doctrine (based
on contract principles) was too narrow to address personal privacy needs because
"modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such
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developed, however, certain requirements under privacy law proved

too cumbersome to provide meaningful protection and did not
93
accommodate certain factual circumstances.
Beginning in the 1960s, courts began to revitalize the breach of
confidentiality tort by recognizing confidential relationships in a
wider

variety

of contexts.9 4

These

relationships

included

96
banker-depositor, 97
physician-patient, 95 psychiatrist-patient,
and school-student.9 8 But rather than simply expanding the scope
of traditional fiduciary relationships to encompass these relationships as well, many courts moved beyond this framework. Instead
of emphasizing the relationship's fiduciary or kinship nature, the
courts emphasized the customary expectation of confidentiality and
the public policy supporting this expectation. For example, in Blair

v. Union Free School DistrictNo. 6,g9 the court reasoned that
[a]lthough the relationship of a student and a student's family with
a school and its professional employees probably does not
constitute a fiduciary relationship, it is certainly a special or
confidential relationship. In order for the educational process to
function in an effective manner it is patently necessary that the
student and the student's family be free to confide in the
professional staff of the school with the assurance that such
confidences will be respected. 100

Thus, without any statutory or contractual basis, the court
determined that for the good of the "educational process,"
information disclosed to school officials should be held in
confidence and that any breach of this confidence should be
10 1
actionable under tort law.
wrongs without any participation by the injured party." Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 9, at 211.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 65-78.
94 For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Vickery, supra note 11,
at 1428-34.
95 See e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985).
96 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 674 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
97 See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 289-90 (Idaho
1961).
98
See, e.g., Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 227 (Dist Ct.
1971).

99 Id.

100 Id. at 228.
101 One court, however, has held that statutory law must support a finding that
public policy requires a confidential relationship. See Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985); infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
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This approach to confidential relationships was first explicitly
acknowledged by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's.l °2
In that case, a plastic surgeon
disclosed photographs of his patient before and after cosmetic
surgery. The court held that the physician had breached a duty of
confidentiality to his patient through this disclosure.1 0
In
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the following standard:
The tort of breach of "confidential relationship" is generally
described as consisting of the "unconsented, unprivileged
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the
defendant has learned within a "confidential relationship." It
arises from the limited duty that attaches to "nonpersonal
relationships customarily understood to carry an obligation of
confidence." That limited duty conveys a standard that is more
strict than the reasonable man test and provides fair warning to
potential defendants that "for so palpable a wrong, the law
provides a remedy." 10 4
Relying on the limited-duty standard, the court reasoned that the
public policy of the District of Columbia strongly suggested that the
physician-patient relationship should be deemed confidential as a
10 5
matter of law.
The limited-duty approach is fundamental to the reconceptualized tort of breach of confidential relationship. Embodied in this
approach are three closely related limitations. 10 6 First, the key
element of this duty is the nature of the relationship, not the kind
of information exchanged. Second, this relationship must be of a
public nature that goes beyond mere friendship, family, or
confessor-confidant. Third, this relationship must be customarily
understood to carry an obligation of confidence, not simply one in
which an individual would reasonably believe that such information
should be confidential.
All of these limitations serve roughly the same purpose: to
ensure that the parties realize and expect that information
exchanged should not be disclosed to third parties. The parameters
102

492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985). The court heavily relies on a student comment

that recognized the evolution of the new tort of breach of confidentiality and
proposed a standard for recognizing confidential relationships. See id. at 589;
Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455-62.
103 See Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 592.
104 Id. at 591 (emphasis added) (citing Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455, 1460).
105 Id. at 591-92.
106 See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1460-61.
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of personal relationships are prone to uncertainty and the
emotional nature of such relationships makes expectations uncertain. 107 In contrast, nonpersonal relationships often have a
clearly defined scope and the information exchanged in such relationships is done so with a particular purpose in mind. The
"customary" requirement further limits this tort to only those
relationships that typically give rise to confidentiality concerns. For
example, personal information exchanged within the seller-buyer
relationship would not typically be thought of as confidential.
This line between confidential and nonconfidential relationships
serves several purposes, both practical and legal. In a practical
sense, the approach alleviates the evidentiary burden of proving
whether confidentiality was expected in the particular factual
circumstance. Once the existence of the relationship is proved, the
factual inquiry turns on expectations within such a relationship in
the abstract.1 0 8 This stands in contrast to the more traditional ap10 9
proach of identifying confidential relationships.
In a legal sense, the tort's differentiation between confidential
and nonconfidential is in keeping with a notion fundamental to tort
law: the law should provide notice of the relative risks and
consequences of one's actions. 110 But more importantly, this
differentiation also serves to minimize First Amendment concerns.
As discussed earlier, the private-facts tort faces constitutional
pressure because it is based partially on speech content and relies
on a subjective standard. l l The tort of breach of confidential
107 For a proposal of how confidentiality could protect personal privacy in
nonprofessional relationships, see generally G. Michael Harvey, Comment,
Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
2385 (1992). Harvey argues that the courts should recognize a breach of
confidentiality in this context where there is an explicit and voluntary agreement
between the parties and disclosure is "public." Id. at 2393. He emphasizes that
"individuals themselves would bear the burden of delineating what is and is not
private." Id. at 2395.
108 See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1461.
1
'09See Gregory B. Westfall, Comment, "But I Know It When I See It".• A
PracticalFrameworkfor Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciay Relationships, 23
TEx. TECH L. REv. 835, 842-43 (1992) (stating that under Texas law only
traditional fiduciary relationships which exist as a matter of law are entitled to a
presumption of confidentiality and that all other confidential relationships must be
proven on a case-by-case basis).
110
See Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and
Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1171 (1992) ("Tort liability must
be premised on the realistic belief that the tortfeasor will be put on notice of the
tortious conduct.").
11 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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relationship, however, does not face such constitutional pitfalls. For
this tort, the court simply focuses on whether an unauthorized
disclosure has taken place within the context of a confidential
relationship. The content of this disclosure is not relevant for
112
purposes of liability.
The Supreme Court has been generally more sympathetic to
limitations on speech which stem from a prior agreement between
the parties. 113 Recently, the Court suggested that it prefers this
type of limitation compared to the content-based method:
In [private-fact tort] cases, the State itself defined the content of
publications that would trigger liability. . . . [B]y contrast,
Minnesota simply requires those making promises [of
confidentiality] to keep them. The parties themselves ... determine the scope of their legal obligations and any restrictions which
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self1 14
imposed.
Similarly, when entering into a common-law confidential relation-

ship, parties implicitly promise not to make unauthorized disclosures to third parties.
Some may argue that such a promise of confidentiality should
be explicit before liability attaches. While such a requirement may
be in keeping with the idea that constitutional rights should not be
easily divested, 115 courts have not required explicit agreements in
the context of relationships traditionally recognized as fiduciary at
common law.1 16 Presumably, this practice stems from the belief
that certain relationships inherently convey an obligation not to

112 The amount of damages awarded, however, would turn on the content and
nature of the disclosure. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980) (holding that a
former CIA agent had no First Amendment right to breach obligation to CIA
which required prepublication clearance).
114 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519 (1991). Even in dissent,
Justice David Souter acknowledged that promises of confidentiality should be
enforced where the plaintiff is not a public figure. See id. at 2523 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Harvey, supra note 107, at 2424.
115 In Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985), the court
stated that restricting speech based on simply a customary confidential relationship
violated the state constitution's free speech clause. See id. at 534. It held,
however, that a confidential relationship grounded in statutory law could be the
basis of liability. See id.
116 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,311,
R 75, 619 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) ("There are certain demands made upon attorneys
which may in fact interfere with unfettered speech, such as the duty to preserve a
client's confidences."), afftd, 652 F.2d 57, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2322 (1981).
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disclose. The relationship itself serves as a proxy for a promise of
confidentiality and places the parties on notice of potential tortious
conduct. In this way, the legal obligation not to disclose is selfimposed and does not conflict with First Amendment principles.
It must be noted that few courts have explicitly adopted the
limited-duty approach. Many courts continue to adhere to the
fiduciary conception of such a relationship. For example, in Brandt
v. Medical Defense Associates,I1 7 the court recognized the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship by analogy to
traditional fiduciary relationships such as those between officers of
a corporation and shareholders. 118 In Schoneweis v. Dando,119
the court refused to recognize a confidential relationship between
a creditor bank and a debtor because the information imparted by
the bank was not received in its capacity as an agent. 120 The
court noted, however, that the information imparted by the bank
was not of the kind that one would "normally expect would be kept
121
confidential."
One court has characterized Vickery's formulation as problematic and casting too wide of a net. 12 2 The court stated:
The problem with [Vickery's] formulation of civil liability lies in
identifying the confidential relationships that carry a duty of
keeping secrets.
[He] suggests that the duty arises in all
nonpersonal relationships "customarily understood" to carry an
obligation....
We do not think that the law casts so wide a net. It requires
more than custom to impose legal restraints on "the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever." . .. [The]
legal duty not to speak, unless voluntarily assumed in entering the
relationship, will not be imposed by courts or jurors in the name
12
of custom or reasonable expectations.
The court rejected the lower court's rationale, which had recognized
a confidential relationship between physician and patient based on
public policy and common expectations.124
It nonetheless
17
8

856 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1993).

1 See id. at 670 (noting that a "physician has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality
not to disclose any medical information received in connection with his treatment
of the patient").
119 435 N.W.2d 666 (Neb. 1989).
120 See id. at 673.
121 Id. (quoting Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 1978)).
122 See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 533-34 (Or. 1985).
12- Id. (citations omitted).
124
See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 684 P.2d 581, 585-87 (Or. Ct. App.
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affirmed that the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship
could be based on legal sources, such as a patient's statutory
privilege to exclude a physician's testimony in litigation and
125
statutory professional regulations.
The rationale behind the court's distinction between duties
based on custom and duties inferred from statutory law is not
altogether clear.
This approach seems too restrictive on the
traditional ability of courts to create a new remedy at common law
where they are confronted with injuries that should be
compensated. Moreover, the court does not explain how traditional
common-law fiduciary relationships-some finding little support in
126
statutory law-nevertheless satisfy such scrutiny.
C.

Consideringthe Employee-Employer
Relationship Confidential

Traditionally, the employee-employer relationship has not been
considered a confidential relationship by the courts. 12 7 Given the
possible change in the way courts approach confidential
relationships, however, establishment of such a relationship is now
128
conceivable.

1984), affd in par; rev'd in part, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985).
125 See Humphers, 696 P.2d at 534-36.
126 Even if one accepts the Humphers court's restrictive approach, the employeremployee relationship may still be considered confidential. In at least one
jurisdiction, courts recognize an employment record privilege stemming from a
constitutional right to privacy. This legal source may be sufficient to legitimize the
confidentiality of this relationship. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
127 See WESTIN,
supra note 19, at 335 (asserting that confidential
communications between employer and employee were not historically considered
by courts to be entitled to privacy). In a recent California case, the court refused
to recognized this relationship as confidential. See Amid v. Hawthorne Community Medical Group, Inc., 261 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that a
"bare employee-employer relationship" did not create a confidential relationship
where a hospital-employer disclosed a medical performance evaluation of a doctoremployee to a health insurer).
128 Making the employee-employer relationship confidential at common law has
been addressed before, but not in a detailed manner. In 1974, one commentator
raised this as a possibility but ultimately concluded that it was unlikely in the near
future. See Mironi, supra note 4, at 279-80, 286. The commentator did not rule
out the possibility, but concluded that "[t]o walt for courts to establish commonlaw protection is too great a risk. Change must come from federal and state
legislation." Id. at 288. Given that the courts have not done so in the 19 years
since the article's publication, the commentator's fears at that time appear to be
justified. It is also apparent, however, that he based his conclusions on the limited
framework that the courts used at the time and did not foresee the coming
changes in the tort of breach of confidential relationship. He stated: "In the
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The employee-employer relationship satisfies the three-part
limited-duty concept of confidential relationships proposed by
Vickery and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.1 29 First,
the relationship aspect of employee-employer interaction is clearly
defined and recognized by the parties involved from the beginning.
The tie between employee and employer is neither speculative nor
prone to misinterpretation. The relationship is fundamental to the
economic structure and a necessary part of most persons' everyday
lives.Is ° Moreover, the employee-employer relationship has deep
roots in common and statutory law. The law of agency recognizes
employer liability in several contexts while state and federal statutes
impose many restrictions and duties on individuals13who enter this
relationship either as an employee or an employer. '
Second, the employee-employer relationship clearly satisfies the
nonpersonal requirement. It is a contractual relationship in which
information is divulged for reasons of economic necessity, not
because of emotional or familial ties.
Third, and most importantly, the employee-employer relationship strongly suggests an expectation and custom of confidentiality.
When an employee gives information to her employer, such as
financial records, medical records, or criminal records, this
information is given for one reason only: to aid the employer in her
ability to run her business effectively. There is an implicit
expectation that these records will be used for their intended
purpose. Moreover, the nature of the information itself strongly
suggests that it is to be kept confidential. In nearly every other
context in one's life, when information about one's health or
finances is exchanged between individuals in a non-social context,
an expectation of confidentiality is assumed.
absence of legislation, the courts are not quick to enlarge common-law privileges.
'U]udges have not shown any enthusiasm for broadening them [the confidential
relationship privileges] to include information given to reporters, school
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This expectation is based on more than mere custom132
Courts have acknowledged the sensitivity of this information
through statutory interpretation and confidentiality concerns during
the discovery process. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,13 3 the
Supreme Court held that an employer was justified in withholding
from the union the aptitude test scores of named employees on the
grounds that absolute confidentiality of such information was
necessary to avoid employee embarrassment.13 4 The Court stated
that "[tfhe sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence is
sufficiently well known to be an appropriate subject of judicial
notice."13 5 Thus, the Court weighed the expectation of confidentiality heavily against the union's statutory right to gain access to
information relevant to its duties as the employees' bargaining
136
representative.
In another context, some courts have been sensitive to
13 7
personnel record confidentiality during pretrial discovery.
132 See Humphers, 696 P.2d at 534-36 (court unwilling to base a confidential
relationship on custom alone and instead looking to "legal" sources of an
expectation of confidentiality).
133 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
134 See id. at 317.
135 Id. at 318.
136 See id. at 319.
137 In California, courts have held that allowing discovery of personnel files
absent a compelling need violates the state constitutional right to privacy. See
Harding Lawson Assocs. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 539 (Ct. App.
1992) (holding that "the balance will favor privacy for confidential information in
third party personnel files unless the litigant can show a compelling need for the
particular documents and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained
through depositions or from nonconfidential sources"); El Dorado Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Ct. App. 1987) (nullifying lower
court order compelling production of entire employee personnel file in
employment discrimination suit on grounds that less intrusive means must first be
considered); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 165 (Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery of
personnel records given the privacy issues at stake); see also Cutter v. Brownbridge,
228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986) ("In the context of discovery of
confidential information in personnel files, even when such information is directly
relevant to litigation, discovery will not be permitted until a balancing of the
compelling need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy determines
that disclosure is appropriate.").
While California bases the personnel file privilege on state constitutional law,
other states have based this privilege on public policy considerations. See DeLoitte
Haskins & Sells v. Green, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) ("Clearly, the
discoverability of [personnel files] must be balanced against the competing
interests that appellant and its affected employees have in the maintenance of the
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Facing discovery requests for personnel records pertaining to the
litigation, courts will "favor privacy for confidential information in
third party personnel files unless the litigant can show a compelling
need for the particular documents and that the information cannot
reasonably be obtained through depositions or from nonconfidential
sources."1" 8 The existence of an employment record privilege
strongly supports the idea that courts should recognize the
employer-employee relationship as confidential. In an analogous
situation, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized a
confidential relationship between physician and patient based in
part on a law that excluded the in-court testimony of physicians
about their patients except in limited circumstances. 1s The court
reasoned that this and other local statutes "suggest that the policy
in this jurisdiction is to encourage candor by patients and
confidentiality by physicians."1 40
Likewise, the employment
record privilege suggests that it is the policy of those jurisdictions
to protect the confidentiality interests of employees. To the extent
that courts themselves acknowledge and affirm the custom of
confidentiality in the employer-employee context, they should have
little trouble finding this expectation "customary" as a matter of
141
law.

confidentiality and privacy of the internally generated personnel records and
evaluations.").
3
1 8 Harding Lawson Assocs., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539. This is not to say that
courts will never allow discovery of employment records under this standard.
Courts have occasionally found a compelling need for the production of these
documents. See, e.g., Dixon v. Rutgers, 541 A.2d 1046, 1058 (N.J. 1988) (holding
that peer review materials in personnel file were discoverable in antidiscrimination
suit but stating that the court should "take various measures designed to minimize
intrusion into their confidentiality").
139 See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985) (citing D.C.
Code
§ 14-307 (1981)).
140
Id.

One court has held that basing confidential relationships on custom alone
unduly infringed the state's constitutional freedom of speech clause. See
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or. 1985). Instead of
custom, the court stated that such a relationship could only arise from "legal"
sources, such as statutory privilege and statutory professional regulations. See id.
141

Thus, where a privilege stemming from constitutional or statutory law buttresses a

court's finding of custom, such constitutional problems disappear. See supra notes
122-26 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE TORT IN PRACTICE

For the tort of breach of confidential relationship, a cause of
action consists of the "'unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a
third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned
This definition breaks
within a confidential relationship.'"142
down into four basic elements: (1) the existence of a confidential
relationship, (2) disclosure of nonpublic information that the
defendant learned within the relationship, (3) disclosure to a third
party, and (4) possible defenses, including consent and statutory and
public policy privileges. The following four sections discuss each of
these elements as applied to the employment context. A fifth
section discusses the possible remedies available for breach of
confidential relationship.
A. The Employment Relationship
As discussed earlier, the confidential nature of the employment
relationship would be a matter of law and not dependent on case-bycase analysis. 143 Thus, the court's inquiry here should simply be
whether an employment relationship exists; once this fact is
established, the court would assume that there is a confidential
relationship between the parties.
Proving this element should be neither difficult nor controversial. Due to the frequency of vicarious liability in tort suits, courts
already have a well-developed common law of agency concerning
what constitutes an employer-employee relationship. 144 Although
the adoption of this definition would exclude some individuals from
bringing suit for breach of confidentiality-most notably
independent contractors1 45-this limitation is both necessary and
sound. The reconceptualized tort of breach of confidentiality turns
in large part on a duty limited to the context of a special
relationship. 146
As discussed earlier, entering into this
142 Vassilizdes, 492 A.2d at 591 (quoting Vickery, supra note 11, at 1455); see
also Street v. Hedgepath, 607 A.2d 1238, 1246 (D.C. 1992) (quoting this language
to define the tort of breach of confidential relationship).
143 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.

144 See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)

(1957) (stating the

common criteria by which courts establish an employer-employee (master-servant)
relationship, including such factors as the degree of control, the standard practice
of the industry, the method of payment, and the intent of the parties).
145 See id. § 220 cmt. e.
146 See Vickery, supra note 11, at 1460.
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relationship serves to place the parties on notice that information
14 7
exchanged within this context should be held confidential.
This alleviates possible First Amendment concerns. 14 8 To the
extent that the definition of employee is vague or subject to ad hoc
case-by-case interpretation, it would be difficult to assume that the
defendant implicitly agreed not to disclose information acquired
through the relationship. 149 Moreover, the common law of agency is broad enough to include most situations in which the
defendant would have access to sensitive information about the
plaintiff. Indeed, some of the factors considered relevant to agency,
such as the length of employment and the method of payment, are
directly correlated with the likelihood that sensitive records are
collected and maintained.1 50
B. The Nature of Confidential Information
The second element of proof for this tort presents a more
difficult problem. What kind of information should a court
consider "confidential" for the purpose of breach of confidentiality
in the employment setting? While the type of information
protected in the physician-patient or attorney-client context may be
clear, the large variety of information typically kept by
employers15 1 makes the scope of protection more difficult.
Admittedly, employers hold some information that would not
usually be considered "confidential," such as published telephone
numbers of employees and perhaps the very fact that the individual
is an employee. It can hardly be argued that an employer should be
held liable for breach of confidentiality when the information
disclosed was already public knowledge or widely accessible. Thus,
an employee must demonstrate to the court that the information
1 52
disclosed by her employer was not publicly known.
147 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

14s See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(f), (g) (1957).

Thus, a

defendant who takes the time to maintain a personnel file and who keeps a record
of payment regarding the plaintiff will more likely be deemed an employer under
agency law.
151 See supra part I.B.
152 This requirement contrasts with the elements of common-law breach of
privacy, where the plaintiff must prove that "private" facts were disclosed and that
such a disclosure would be "offensive" to the reasonable person. See KEETON ET
AL,., supra note 14, § 117, at 856-57; Mironi, supra note 4, at 281-82; supra text
accompanying notes 73-78. Instead of turning on the content of the disclosure,
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Employers may be concerned that disclosures regarding
termination of employment (that is, whether the former employee
was laid off or fired) may expose them to liability. Under defamation law, an employer's statement that an employee was terminated
is insufficient to establish a cause of action.1 53 In the context of
breach of confidentiality, however, an employer's disclosure of
termination to a third-party would presumably be actionable. Some
may be opposed to this result, arguing that this type of information
is not analogous to that supplied by the employee for the purpose
of employment and thus should not be deemed confidential.
Rather, the kind of information generated by the employment
relationship should be under the control of the employer as well as
the employee.
This distinction, however, does not find support from the
purpose of the tort of breach of confidentiality. Both kinds of
information-that brought to the employment relationship and that
generated by it-are potentially very sensitive and harmful to the
employee if divulged. Employees should be able to control who
knows and who does not know the details of their employment
history; employers should not have the discretion to make this
154
decision for them.
A difficult question arises when employers are simply asked to
verify information already held by third parties. For example, it is
a common practice for financial institutions to confirm salary
information provided in an application for credit. 155 Since the

liability for this tort turns in part on whether such facts were publicly known.
153 See Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987)
(holding that inferences which may have been drawn by third parties as a result of
the termination do not give rise to a defamation cause of action).
154 Some may argue that by making termination information more difficult to
procure, employers will be less able to hire qualified employees and may even
expose themselves to liability for negligent referral. See Swerdlow, supra note 47,
at 1670-71 (arguing that employers should have a duty to warn future employers
about employee misconduct). Such a concern, however, would be better
addressed if employers insisted on recommendations from previous employers
before hiring. While future employment may ultimately depend on an individual's
willingness to allow her former employer to disclose information, the individual
still maintains control over the information.
Note that this type of employer hard bargaining differs from a circumstance
in which an employer refuses to hire or terminates an individual because she
refuses to contract out of the confidential relationship. See infra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text.
155 See Letter from Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., (1993) ("By signing the
application, ...
[y]ou authorize your employer ... to release and/or verify
information to Citibank ... in order to determine your eligibility. .. .") (on file
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employee has already disclosed the information to the third party,
the employer's verification of these facts may not appear to be a
"disclosure." Verification may not always be so straightforward,
however, as leading allegations may be tantamount to disclosure.
For example, if someone suspected an individual of drug use, an
employer's response to a third-party's question such as "Can you
confirm that your employee has taken leave for drug treatment?"
would effectively amount to a disclosure. Thus, under this tort, the
employer must confirm that its employee has consented to the thirdparty verification if it wants to avoid potential liability. This could
be done either by securing the employee's consent to disclose or by
requesting that the third party present a signed statement from the
15 6
employee indicating the employee's authorization.
A similar question arises concerning third-party inquiries for
opinions regarding employees.
Employers usually request
references from previous employers as part of the application
process. Under this tort, an employer could be held liable if he or
she makes an unauthorized statement about a former employee.
Thus, an employer would need to take additional precautions before
giving references for its former employees-especially when the
references are solicited by telephone. As in the case of verification,
employers would need to either secure the employee's consent
before giving a recommendation or request a statement from the
1 57
third party to that effect.
C. Definition of "Third Party"

In many circumstances, the issue of who constitutes a third party
will be straightforward: any individual or entity other than the
employer or employee will be a third party. Third parties could
include banks, credit agencies, private investigators, solicitation
organizations, and even employee relatives. 15 8 Difficulties arise,
with author).
156 Oftentimes, it will be in the employee's interest to have such information
verified, as verification may be necessary for approval of a loan. In practice,
therefore, an employee may wish to give her employer prior authorization to verify
certain third-party inquiries. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
157 Where employee consent is procured, this consent should not serve as a
privilege against potential liability for defamation. See supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
158 Union representatives and government officials, including officers of the
court, would also be considered third parties. In many circumstances, however,
disclosures to these parties would not create liability because of statutory provi-
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however, when considering third parties with a close relationship to
the employer, such as outside auditing firms, accountants, attorneys,
1 59
and unemployment insurance personnel.
In some instances, employers need to disclose confidential
information about their employees in order to conduct their
business.1 60 If employers were required to gain employee consent
every time they wanted to grant third-party access in the regular
course of their business, this could significantly hamper business
efficiency and control. Thus, courts should construe the term "third
party" to exclude agents of the employer that perform businessrelated services for a legitimate business purpose. 161 Conceptually, these agents would be synonymous with the employer. Likewise,
employer disclosures to its own employees or managers would be
guided by the same business-related purpose definition of "third
16 2
party."

sions mandating these types of disclosures. See infra note 165 and accompanying
text.
159 Cf Multnomah Legal Servs. Workers Union v. Legal Servs. Corp., 936 F.2d
1547 (9th Cir. 1991). In this case, a local legal services employees' union sought
to enjoin Legal Services Corporation (a federally created, nonprofit oversight
corporation that distributes federal legal aid funds) from gaining access to the
union's personnel files, claiming that such an action was not necessary to perform
its contractual and statutorily mandated oversight duties. See id. at 1550-53. The
court of appeals reversed a lower court's injunction and held that contract
principles, statutes, and regulations did not require that the demand for
documents by Legal Services Corporation be "'necessary and reasonable.'" See id.
at 1556-57.
160 Under defamation law, statements made by employers to third parties with
a "common business concern" are privileged unless actual malice can be shown.
See, e.g., Pappas v. Air France, 652 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
statements made by an employer to the Department of Labor concerning an
employee's unemployment benefits were privileged).
161 A Connecticut statute requiring employee consent for disclosure of
personnel files states that information should not be disclosed to "any person or
entity not employed by or affiliated with the employer" and makes explicit
exceptions for "a third party that maintains or prepares employment records or
performs other employment-related services for the employer" and for disclosures
made in "defense of personnel-related complaints against the employer." CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f(1)-(2) (West 1987).
162 Under privacy law, statements made to certain employees and members of
management may be actionable where there is no reason to make such statements.
See Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 152, 154 (Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that an employee's right to privacy was violated when his employer
posted an interoffice memo regarding the employee's dismissal).
Under
defamation law, such statements are usually privileged.
See Grynberg v.
Alexander's Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that an
employer's statement to certain employees regarding plaintiff's termination was
privileged), appeal denied, 521 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1988). When statements are made
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D. Statutory Law and Public Policy Exceptions
If a court extends the common-law tort of breach of confidentiality to the employment context, this would not alter existing
federal and state law that may mandate employer disclosure in
certain circumstances. 163 Employers would not be held liable for
breach of confidentiality when disclosing personnel records to third
parties pursuant to judicial orders or parties' requests for
documents during pretrial discovery. 164 Likewise, disclosures
made in response to a federal or state statute would not be actionable-most notably disclosures to the Department of Labor and to
union representatives.165 Of course, employers and employees
to those who do not need to know the information, this privilege may be lost. See
Haddad v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 526 F.2d 83, 85 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that an
employer's statement about an employee's misdeeds to other employees was not
privileged where the employer had no legitimate reason to disclose such informa-

tion).

168 A Connecticut statute requiring employee consent for disclosure makes
exceptions where the disclosure is made "pursuant to a lawfully issued
administrative summons or judicial order, including a search warrant or subpoena,
or in response to a government audit... ; to comply with federal, state, or local
laws or regulations; or... where the information is disseminated pursuant to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f.
'4 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (defining the scope of production of
documents for pretrial discovery).
165 Employers regulated by the Occupational Health and Safety Act must make
available to the Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Health and Human Services all
relevant records regarding employees, including medical and toxic exposure data.
See 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 85.5(a) (1992); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing federal
officials access to past and present employee medical records due to suspected
workplace health hazard and rejecting employer's assertion that such act violated
employee privacy).
Federal contractors required to administer affirmative action programs must
provide the government with a listing of all job titles with wage rates or salary
ranges, sex, and race or ethnic background of the employees holding those positions. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(a) (1992). If an employer is concerned about the
confidentiality of this information, then "alphabetic or numeric coding or the use
of an index of pay and pay ranges are acceptable" for determining whether the
contractor is complying with federal regulations. Id. § 60-60.4(a). In addition,
employers have the opportunity to identify any information "which they believe is
not subject to disclosure" under the Freedom of Information Act. Id. § 60-60.4(d).
Employer disclosures to union representatives are to a large degree regulated
by the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
In
interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court held that the duty to bargain collectively
and in good faith imposed on the employer a duty to provide relevant information
to labor unions. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956). In
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979), however, the Court
suggested that this duty should be balanced against the confidentiality interests of
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may still take advantage of any special privilege that exists regarding
166
the disclosure of personnel files.
Difficulty may arise when it is not entirely clear if an employer
would be required to disclose as a matter of law. One can foresee
a situation in which an employer fears a potential contempt of court
charge if it does not disclose and a potential suit for breach of
confidentiality if it does. For this reason, an employer should not
be liable for breach of confidentiality when167it makes a good faith
effort to comply with court orders or rules.
In the case of an on-the-job medical emergency, employers may
need to disclose confidential information to medical personnel, such
as existing medical conditions, prescription drug use, or a history
of illegal drug use. As a matter of public policy, and in the interest
of informed medical treatment, courts should not subject employers
168
to liability under these circumstances.
the employer.
In a related issue, federal circuit courts are currently split regarding whether
the federal government must supply employee addresses to unions under the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4)(B)
(1988) (stating that federal agencies must furnish to unions such data as is
.necessary for full and proper ... scope of collective bargaining"); United States
Dep't of the Navy v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 975 F.2d 348, 355 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that disclosure was prohibited by Exemption 6 of the Freedom of
Information Act); Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. Department of the Navy, 963
F.2d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 1992) (same). But see Federal Labor Relations Auth. v.
United States Dep't of Navy, 958 F.2d 1490, 1497 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
disclosure was mandated by the Freedom of Information Act).
166 In some states, employers enjoy a privilege against aiding discovery or
giving testimony regarding confidential employee information. See e.g., El Dorado
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 235 Cal. Rptr. 303, 305 (Ct. App. 1987)
(nullifying lower court order compelling production of an entire employee
personnel file in an employment discrimination suit on the grounds that consideration must first be given to whether less intrusive means would yield the
information sought); Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App.
1986) ("In the context of discovery of confidential information in personnel files,
even when such information is directly relevant to litigation, discovery will not be
permitted until a balancing of the compelling need for discovery against the
fundamental right of privacy determines that disclosure is appropriate.").
167 This good-faith exception should not extend to voluntary disclosures made
to police during the course of an investigation, unless made pursuant to the
employer's own culpability. Cf. Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear, 771 P.2d 114, 117 (Mont.
1989) (holding that employer's statements should not be privileged in a
defamation suit where the employer made an unsolicited complaint to the police).
'68 Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-128f(4) (providing an exception to required employee consent where disclosure is made "in response to an apparent
medical emergency or to apprise the employee's physician of a medical condition
of which the employee may not be aware").
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E. Consent and Contracting
Out of Liability

While the tort of breach of confidentiality would give employees
some assurance that their employers will not disclose information
to third parties, there are several circumstances in which employees
may actually want employers to disclose information about themmost typically the verification of salary data to financial institutions
and references for future employment. 169
In these cases,
employees would "contract out" of the confidential relationship by
giving their employers consent to disclose specified information to
third parties.

170

The potential exists, however, for employers to coerce employees to contract out of the relationship. An employer could make all
potential and current employees sign a comprehensive consent
statement as a condition of employment thus absolving the
employer of all liability for breach of confidentiality. 171 In
jurisdictions that may recognize this tort, however, courts would
likely find such practices contrary to public policy. When employers
169 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
170 The issue of waiver is common in other confidential relationship contexts.

See e.g., Street v. Hedgepath, 607 A.2d 1238, 1248 (D.C. 1992) (holding that
waiver of physician-patient relationship privilege by filing medical malpractice
action was consent to disclosure of confidential information); Doe v. Roe, 588
N.Y.S.2d 236, 243 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (stating that waiver of statutory physician-patient
privilege may be accomplished by either patient's express consent or by commencement of personal injury action); Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460,
462 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that plaintiff waives confidential relationship of
physician-patient when bringing a personal injury action against physician).
Consent would most likely be in writing, although oral consent would be
legally sufficient if provable. Employers would most likely insist on a signed
statement as a shield against liability in cases where the facts are in dispute.
171 At least one employer already "asks" employees to sign a broadly worded
consent form for the release of medical records to insurance companies. See
Mubarark S. Dahir, Your Health, Your Privacy, Your Boss, PHILA. CrIY PAPER, May
28-June 4, 1993, at 10. The text of the records authorization clause states:
To all physicians, surgeons and other medical practitioners, all hospitals,
clinics and other health care facilities, all insurance carriers, insurance
data service organizations, all pension and welfare fund administrators,
my current employer, all of my former employers and all other persons,
agencies or entities who may have records or evidence relating to my
physical or mental condition; I hereby authorize release and delivery of
any and all information, records and documents (confidential or
otherwise) with respect to my health and health history that you or any of
you, now have or hereafter obtain to the administrator of an employee
benefit plan sponsored by [the employer].
Id. at 11.
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force their potential employees to waive all breach of confidentiality
claims, courts could refuse to recognize such agreements in any
future litigation. 172 In instances where an employer dismisses an
employee for failure to grant authorization or initiates an action
based on breach of confidentiality, courts could treat the failure to
hire or the dismissal as a wrongful discharge-possibly
granting the
173
employee back pay or reinstatement.
F. Remedies

In many cases, damages stemming from an employer's breach of
confidentiality will take the form of mental anguish and negligent
emotional distress. 174 For example, when an employer discloses
an employee's criminal record to a third party, the damages would
compensate the victim for the humiliation and loss of standing
among peers that results from the disclosure. The employee's
recovery should not be contingent on accompanying physical harmas is the case in other tort contexts-because the nature of the
breach of confidentiality is inherently mental and subjective. 17
172 Cf O'Connor v. Police Comm'r, 557 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Mass. 1990)
(noting that the reasonableness of the conditions under which consent was given is
an appropriate element to consider in the balancing inquiry that determines
whether a right to privacy was violated).
173 Several jurisdictions recognize wrongful discharge actions based on public
policy grounds alone. See, e.g., Sugarman v. RCA Corp., 639 F. Supp. 780, 784
(M.D. Pa. 1985) (finding an exception to the at-will doctrine where important
issues of public policy are raised); Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 509 N.E.2d 297, 300
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that there is an exception to the at-will doctrine
where clearly defined and established public policy is threatened by the employer's
action); Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 514 A.2d 818, 821 (N.H.
1986) (holding that there is an exception to the at-will doctrine where the
discharge results from performing an act that public policy encourages or from
refusing to perform an act that public policy discourages); Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 1989) (finding an exception to the at-will
doctrine where an employee is discharged for reasons contrary to established and
substantial public policy). But see Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal.
1992) (holding that public policy claims must be grounded in a statute or
constitutional provision).
174 See Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff showed damages of emotional distress and mental anguish
where plaintiffs attorney breached duty of confidentiality by revealing information
to district attorney).
175 See National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that award of damages for mental anguish in invasion of
privacy action was valid because injuries in such actions are essentially mental and
subjective even though general rule in Texas denied such damages absent physical

injury); see also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3, at 528
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There may be some instances, however, in which the employer's
breach of confidentiality does not actually cause mental anguish or
emotional distress. For example, an employer could disclose an
employee's unlisted telephone number to a creditor. Such an action
may cause significant annoyance, but it would probably be difficult
to prove that it caused anything more. Nonetheless, even where
employers cause only "trivial" harm through their disclosures, there
is still a sense of loss of control over one's personal
information.176 For this reason, courts should award at least
177
nominal damages for these disclosures.
Occasionally, the employer's disclosure may be so egregious or
intentionally harmful that punitive or exemplary damages would be
in order.1 78
Courts have found that punitive damages are
appropriate for breach of confidentiality when the defendant's
conduct is sufficiently blameworthy. 17 9 Such damages would
presumably be justified in a case where an employer purposefully
discloses information to harm or humiliate an employee. For
example, a court or jury may impose punitive damages where an
employer "blacklists" an employee by disclosing that the employee
1 80
has filed a worker compensation claim.

(1973) (stating that for torts based on protection of personality or dignitary
interests, including invasion of privacy, "damages are 'presumed' or the wrong is
said to be damage in and of itself"). Even though the authorities cited above
concern invasion of privacy and not breach of confidentiality, courts do not draw a
distinction between the two for purposes of damages. See Perez v. Kirk &
Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d at 267 (citing to privacy tort case to support proposition that
emotional distress and mental anguish damages were available for breach of
confidentiality).
176
See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the value of
personal autonomy).
177 See Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819, 825 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that relief
for tortious invasion of privacy entitles plaintiff to "at least nominal damages").
But see Hooper v. Gill, 557 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (stating that
while plaintiff was arguably entitled to nominal damages for doctor's breach of
confidentiality, amount recoverable would be "absolutely de minimis in view of the
costs in judicial time of retrial on the sole issue of nominal damages").
178 This is not to suggest that many employers maliciously or even intentionally
disclose information about their employees. Admittedly, most disclosures occur
because of employer carelessness. In the context of a confidential relationship,
however, such behavior still amounts to the breach of a duty not to disclose.
179 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 599 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that
where doctor discloses patient's HIV status, punitive damages are "recoverable in
common-law actions for breach of confidentiality or breach of fiduciary duty
provided that the defendant's conduct is sufficiently blameworthy").
I80 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Currently, the patchwork of statutes and common-law doctrines
provides wholly inadequate safeguards and remedies for employees
who suffer from disclosure of sensitive information at the hands of
their employers. While federal and state legislation would perhaps
be desirable in this regard, the recently developed common-law tort
of breach of confidentiality provides courts with a legal framework
with which to address this growing problem. Just as courts followed
Warren and Brandeis's call to "define anew" the protection of
person and property in the early part of this century, 181 today's
judiciary should expand the tort of breach of confidentiality to
protect the privacy interests of the American workforce.

181

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 193.

